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Abstract 
In this contribution the notion of Big Data is discussed in relation to the monetisation of 
personal data. The claim of some proponents as well as adversaries, that Big Data implies that 
‘n = all’, meaning that we no longer need to rely on samples because we have all the data, is 
scrutinized and found both overly optimistic and unnecessarily pessimistic. A set of 
epistemological and ethical issues is presented, focusing on the implications of Big Data for 
our perception, cognition, fairness, privacy and due process. The article then looks into the 
idea of user centric personal data management, to investigate to what extent this provides 
solutions for some of the problems triggered by the Big Data conundrum. Special attention is 
paid to the core principle of data protection legislation, namely the principle of purpose 
binding. Finally, this contribution seeks to inquire into the influence of Big Data politics on 
self, mind and society, asking the question of how we can prevent ourselves from becoming 
slaves to Big Data. 
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Introduction 
The problem with Big Data is that n = all.1 Or rather, the problem is the claim by 
some of its advocates (and adversaries) that n = all. ‘N = all’ nicely summarises what 
Big Data is about, how it is defined and which are its pitfalls. If it were true Big Data 
could rupture any membrane that shields our inner lives, disrupting the most sacred 
place of both privacy and autonomy, because it would allow its masters to know us 
better – and to know anything better – than we do ourselves. If it were untrue Big 
Data could still uproot our sense of self and our interface with the world, to the extent 
that we cannot contest its outcomes, we have trouble to resist the seemingly clean, 
objective knowledge it produces and we do not have the tools to figure out how we 
are being profiled. If untrue Big Data will generate incorrect discrimination, but even 
if true Big Data can generate unfair or unjustifiable discrimination.  
The problem is, of course, that speaking in terms of true or untrue in relation to Big 
Data does not make sense, because Big Data is about data modelling. Whether top-
down or bottom-up, automated or even autonomic, the better question is whether the 
modelling works, what are its effects and how these effects are distributed. Finally – 
most importantly – the question is what kind of humans we will become when 
interacting with the models that Big Data generates to figure us out. I have already 
succumbed to speaking of Big Data as ‘something’ that figures us out. As if Big Data 
has a mind of its own. It would be so simple to deny this and attribute all its 
predictions to the designers of Big Data technologies or to their users, the advertising 
networks, data brokers, justice authorities, scientists, smart grid operators, and 
whatever other service providers that base their decisions to provide a credit, a job, an 
insurance on Big Data. Or to whatever service providers that outsource their decisions 
to the high speed real time autonomic computing systems that increasingly determine 
our external environment. Take for example the preparations for the Smart Grid that 
will combine real time processing of our energy usage data with flexible pricing to 
enable us to upload energy to the grid and to sell this to our nearest neighbours.2 IBM 
has coined the term autonomic computing, suggesting that autonomous computing 
systems will adapt our external environment just like the autonomic nervous system 
‘runs’ our internal environment: in ways to which we have no conscious access, and 
over which we have no direct control.3 To the extent that Big Data is smart enough to 
operate autonomically, however, it must outsmart both its designers and its users. Big 
Data is smart because it generates solutions we could not have developed, since as 
humans we don’t have enough computing power. So, the use of Big Data generates an 
unpredictability similar to that of an animal; however well trained, we cannot entirely 
control its behaviour. Worse even, it may generate the volatility of volcano eruptions; 
                                                 
1
 In quantitative empirical research ‘n’ stands for the sample, whereas ‘all’ would refer to the entire 
population. If ‘n’ were ‘all’ we would no longer be referring to a sample, because we would be 
researching all the instances of whatever it is we want to investigate.  
2
 HILDEBRANDT, Mireille. Legal Protection by Design in the Smart Grid. Report, assigned by the 
Smart Energy Collective. Nijmegen/Groningen: February 2013, available at   
http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/42/. 
3
 KEPHART, Jeffrey O. and David M. CHESS. The Vision of Autonomic Computing. Computer. 
2003, January, p. 41–50.  
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of ‘acts of god’ as we once called them. It might be that, to the extent that we worship 
Big Data, believe in it and make our selves dependent upon its oracles, it turns into a 
new pantheon, filled with novel gods. Gods of our own making, but not necessarily 
under our control. This indicates that it may indeed be wise to speak of Big Data 
having a mind of its own, without suggesting that its mind is like our mind, and 
without forgetting that its mind is developed initially by businesses, scientists and 
government agencies to make a profit, to construct new knowledge and to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration.  
In this contribution I want to raise the question of the double contingency - the mutual 
interdependence - between Big Data, individual minds and human society. To do this 
I will first (I) investigate how Big Data has been defined, including the provocations 
this has generated from those at home in the field of data science. I will then look into 
some of the solutions being offered (II), for instance by the World Economic Forum, 
to re-establish some form of balance between individual persons and the corporations 
who practically own the data relating to them. I will then also discuss one of the core 
principles of constitutional government, purpose binding (III) – firmly rooted in the 
principle of legality (not to be confused with legalism). In the realm of personal data 
processing, this principle relates not only to Big Data in the hold of data-driven 
governments, but also to the business models of private companies that monetise Big 
Data. To what extent is the sharing, selling and further processing of personal data 
beyond the context of its collection lawful and/or ethical? Is Big Data Analytics 
compatible with prior purpose specification? Or is function creep the holy grail of Big 
Data; is cross contextual data mining what makes for the added value in science, 
business and administration? Must we rethink purpose specification as it is entirely at 
odds with the internal logic of Big Data? I will conclude (IV) by returning to the 
question of the mutual interdependence of Big Data, individual persons and human 
society. 
 
I Defining Big Data: ‘N = All’ 
If you want to improve the performance of your website, you can do AB research.4 It 
means that you make a small change in the layout of your site A and direct half of 
your visitors to site A and the other half to site B, which is the same site but with the 
minor changes. You then log everything the visitors do and calculate how both 
versions of the site match with preferred behaviour (say purchasing behaviour). 
Instead of taking a sample of your website visitors and calling them or sending them 
an email, you just measure the behaviours of all your visitors and act on the findings. 
                                                 
4
 KOHAVI, Ron, Randal M. HENNE, Dan SOMMERFIELD. Practical guide to controlled experiments 
on the web: listen to your customers not to the hippo. In: Proceedings of the 13th ACM SIGKDD 
international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining. New York, NY: ACM, 2007, p. 
959–967, doi:10.1145/1281192.1281295. CHOPRA, Paras. The Ultimate Guide To A/B Testing. 
Smashing Magazine. 2010, see http://www.smashingmagazine.com/2010/06/24/the–ultimate–guide–
to–a–b–testing/. See also e.g. http://elem.com/~btilly/effective-ab-testing/. 
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You no longer depend on the subset that responds, and there is no bias from people 
who provide you with politically correct answers. You don’t have to settle for what 
people say they did or will do, you can just calculate what they did, do and probably 
will do. We, those visitors, are your guinea pigs, though nobody asked for our consent 
to engage in this experiment, nobody paid for our contribution to improve the 
performance of the website, and in fact, we never even noticed.  
 
THE BIG DATA CONUNDRUM: IMPLICATIONS OF A GAME CHANGER  
In their breath-taking Big Data. A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live 
Work and Think, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier describe Big Data 
as referring to: 
things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller scale.5 
This is an important starting point, because obviously Big Data is not merely about a 
big bag of data. The complementary dimension, that is part and parcel of the notion of 
Big Data, is constituted by the techniques to mine relevant patterns from stored or 
even streaming data. These techniques have been named knowledge discovery in 
databases and most of them are now associated with machine learning. KDD has been 
defined as: 
[T]he nontrivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful, and ultimately 
understandable patterns in data.6 
Machine learning has been defined as: 
A machine learns with respect to a particular task T, performance metric P, and type 
of experience E, if the system reliably performs its performance P at task T following 
experience E.7  
Both form the core of Artificial Intelligence the Modern Approach (AIMO),8 not to be 
confused with GOFAI: good old fashioned artificial intelligence. The latter was based 
on deductive models, rule based or case based, assuming that intelligence could be 
modelled and replicated based on a formal model of human intelligence. The modern 
approach, notably machine learning, is based on the notion of agency, defined as the 
                                                 
5
 MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, Viktor, Kenneth CUKIER. Big data: a revolution that will transform 
how we live, work, and think. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013, p. 6.  
6
 FAYYAD, Usama M., Gregory PIATETSKY-SHAPIRO, Padhraic SMYTH, Ramasamy 
UTHURUSAMY. Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. Meno Park, CA - Cambridge, 
MA - London England: AAAI Press / MIT Press, 1996, p. 41. 
7
 MITCHELL, Tom M. Introduction. The Discipline of Machine Learning. Carnegie Mellon 
University, School of Computer Science: 2006, available at http://www-
cgi.cs.cmu.edu/~tom/pubs/MachineLearningTR.pdf.  
8
 RUSSELL, Stuart J, Peter NORVIG, Ernest DAVIS. Artificial intelligence: a modern approach. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010. 
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capability to be interactive, autonomous and adaptive.9 I know that many authors still 
have doubts about machines that learn, but I think it is more productive to admit that 
machines are indeed learning, at high speed, and both differently and similarly as we 
do. This does not imply that machines think like we do, or feel as we may. It does 
raise the question of whether our own learning processes are beginning to change, as a 
consequence of having to interact with learning machines. What does autocomplete 
do to our ways of writing, how does it impact our fluency in language, which 
productive misunderstandings does autocomplete generate between communicating 
friends? Remember that Zizek wrote that communication is a successful 
misunderstanding,10 meaning that we can never really look into each others minds, 
never be sure whether we mean the same thing with the same words. He reminds us 
that this is not a problem to be solved, but a source of creativity. Is autocomplete, 
which nicely forebodes other types of smart environments, like ambient intelligence 
and the Internet of Things,11 a source of creativity, or does it aim for perfection and 
will it in the end take over the production of meaning, though from the perspective of 
a machine? Will we internalize the drive for disambiguation that is inherent in 
machine language, will we come to believe that disambiguity equals perfect 
communication? In other words, the question is not whether machines can ‘really’ 
learn, but whether we will become more like machines because that will make it 
easier to anticipate how they anticipate us?  And if so, is there something important in 
human learning, human thought and human feeling, that we want to preserve?  
Let’s, however, first follow Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier in their quest to explain 
Big Data. Their analysis starts with the notion of ‘n = all’. In traditional quantitative 
research, scientists that aim to uncover regularities in a population were forced to 
investigate a sample, relying on statistics to extrapolate from the sample to the 
population. Examining the whole population was simply impossible or too costly. A 
population can be a set of people, but also a set of animals, plants, stones, landscapes, 
cells, molecules or whatever other entity, event or process. So, the research starts with 
a hypothesis that is tested on the sample. The sample consists of ‘n’ instances of the 
relevant population, suggesting that, to the extent that the sample correctly represents 
the population, the findings on the sample will hold for the population. Such 
traditional research requires developing the hypothesis, composing a representative 
sample, conducting the research and calculating the conclusions take time, expertise 
in the relevant subject matter and – depending on the kind of testing to be done - it 
may also require expensive instruments. Whatever the conclusions, they remain 
uncertain due to the fact that it is not possible to collect all the relevant instances of 
the population.  
                                                 
9
 FLORIDI, Luciano, J.W. SANDERS. On the Morality of Artificial Agents. Minds and Machines (14) 
3, 2004, p. 349–379.  
10
 ZIZEK, Slavoj. Looking awry: an introduction to Jacques Lacan through popular culture. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991, p. 30.  
11
 VAN DEN BERG, Bibi. The Situated Self: Identity in a world of Ambient Intelligence. Nijmegen: 
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2010. AARTS, Emile a Stefano MARZANO. The New Everyday. Views on 
Ambient Intelligence. Rotterdam: 010, 2003. ITU. The Internet of Things. Geneva: International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), 2005. 
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‘N = all’ means that the sample equals the population. It implies that the uncertainty 
generated by the jump from sample to population is absent in the case of Big Data. 
Or, more moderately formulated, it means that the exponential increase of ‘n’ 
substantially reduces this uncertainty. This is linked to the idea that the availability of 
nearly all instances of a given population compensates for potential inaccuracies. 
Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier indeed claim that lack of precision in some instances 
will be corrected by subsequent recordings of further data. The growth of knowledge 
that is made possible by having ‘n = all’, invites further ‘datafication’, promising 
endless opportunities to mine the data in search of new relevant patterns. This is the 
case because such patterns may enable new business models, or – in the case of public 
administration – new business cases for more efficient and effective governance. We 
can say that ‘datafication’ is the process of translating the flux of life into discrete, 
machine readable, measurable, manipulable bits and bytes.12 Datafication reinforces 
the illusion of ‘n = all’, because it enables seemingly unlimited discretization due to 
the reduction of costs and the exponential increase in computing power.  
The current explosion of data actually does two things. First, it turns data into noise: 
the sheer quantity of bits and bytes makes them unreadable for the human eye. 
Second, to turn this noise into information or even knowledge, computational 
techniques of information retrieval have been developed and applied. And as 
indicated earlier, this is not merely about queries that retrieve the original input, but 
increasingly about mining operations that retrieve patterns not previously uncovered. 
Invisible patterns derived from statistical inferencing. Such inferences can be termed 
‘data derivatives’ as Louise Amoore aptly suggests.13 Data derivatives that provide for 
present futures, or in other words, anticipations of the future present. And, as Elena 
Esposito has argued,14 these present futures will shape the future present. The better 
the predictions (the present futures) the more people may act on it and thus change the 
cause and the course of the future present.  
In the mean time, as Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier note, the speed with which new 
data become available and the speed with which correlations within the data sets can 
be mined AND tested, seems to suck the life out of the quest for causality. This is 
rapidly becoming an old-school quest, a search for ‘why’ in an era that works better 
on ‘how, when, where, depending on what’, with no time to sort out the causes 
‘behind’ the correlations. Because by the time you have started your investigation the 
correlations may have been falsified, shown to be spurious or simply followed up 
with novel correlations that ‘work’ better. This point has been made many times, 
notably by Chris Anderson in his provocative article in Wired Magazine ‘The End of 
                                                 
12
 Manipulation is used here in the neutral sense of altering, editing or moving text or data on a 
computer in a skilful manner. The ability to manipulate bits and bytes may result in the capability to 
manipulate a person in the pejorative sense of controlling or influencing a person or a situation 
cleverly, unfairly or unscrupulously. 
13
 AMOORE, Louise. Data Derivatives On the Emergence of a Security Risk Calculus for Our Times. 
Theory, Culture & Society (28) 6, 2011, p. 24–43.  
14
 ESPOSITO, Elena. The Future of Futures: The Time of Money in Financing and Society. Edward 
Elgar, 2011.  
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Theory.15 Indeed, the shift from causation to correlation is based on a consequentialist 
understanding of meaning; to explain the meaning of a correlation one does not revert 
back to causation but one looks forward to what it might effect. From the perspective 
of philosophical pragmatism this is fascinating; it reminds one of the so-called 
pragmatist maxim on the meaning of concepts. This maxim seems particularly ‘apt’ 
for the era of Big Data, if we replace concept by correlation or pattern: 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object.16 
The next big thing that Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier discuss is the shift from 
expertise to data analysis. There seems to be no field in which data analysis is not 
emerging as a game changer, realigning work processes, methodologies, business 
models and business cases. The exposure of the secret surveillance practices of the 
NSA by a system administrator, are a case in point 17. To survive, both the industry 
and government must adapt their decision systems in line with data processing 
operations that progressively dictate what is possible, enabling as well as limiting how 
we perceive the world. This, then, raises the question of free will. Mayer-Schönberger 
& Cukier suggest that we are on the verge of data dictatorship, meaning that we 
become incapable of perceiving reality outside the mediation of Big Data techniques 
and technologies. The authors thus propose that data, data mining, machine-to-
machine communication and computational decision systems may soon take over.  
 
N IS NOT ALL AND ALL IS NOT N 
It seems that Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier start with somewhat unwarranted techno-
optimism and finish with similarly unwarranted techno-pessimism. I will now briefly 
discuss the six provocations developed by boyd & Crawford,18 against the Big Data 
conundrum. First of all, boyd & Crawford agree that automated research changes our 
definition of knowledge. Big Data is not just another addition to knowledge 
generation or knowledge management. It is a game changer. It implies another 
understanding of what counts as knowledge and creates different underpinnings for 
human, machine-to-machine and hybrid decision systems. Contrary, however, to 
                                                 
15
 ANDERSON, Chris. The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete. 
Wired Magazine (16) 7, 2008. Still earlier philosopher of science Isabelle Stenger traced the way 
correlations operate in the era of data mining; actually producing meaning instead of uncovering 
previously existing causes or reasons, e.g. STENGERS, Isabelle. Sciences et pouvoirs. Paris: La 
Découverte, 1997, p. 62-63. 
16
 PEIRCE, Charles Saunders. Selected Writings, Edited with an Introduction and notes by Philip P. 
Wiener. New York: Dover, 1958.  
17
 DAVIDSON, Joe. NSA to cut 90 percent of systems administrators. Federal Eye. In Washington 
Post. 13th August 2013, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-
eye/wp/2013/08/13/nsa-to-cut-90-percent-of-systems-administrators/.  
18
 boyd, danah, Kate CRAWFORD. Critical Questions for Big Data. Information, Communication & 
Society (5) 4, 2012, p. 662–679, doi:10.1080/1369118X.2012.678878. 
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Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier they do not believe in ‘n = all’. Claims to objectivity 
and precision are misleading. I would suggest that this is related to the fact that 
quantification always implies a preceding qualification. To translate the flux of life 
into discrete, machine-readable bits and bytes we must qualify what counts as the 
same type of data, what realities fit what objects and attributes in the data models 
used to map Big Data. This entails interpretation. As has been noted,19 there is no such 
thing as ‘raw data’, data are made, just like facts. As the French say: ‘les faits sont 
faits’. In that sense N is never All, because the flux of life can be translated into 
machine readable data in a number of ways and whichever way is chosen has a major 
impact on the outcome of data mining operations. 
In line with this, boyd & Crawford claim that Bigger Data is not always Better Data 
nor necessarily Whole Data; sometimes Small Data is Best Data. Now, here we have 
a truly revolutionary statement, as far as the Big Data conundrum goes. I believe that 
for data scientists this is nothing new or surprising. Time, human expertise and 
computer power are scarce – contrary to what some Big Data believers like to 
announce. The translation of entities, events and processes into discrete data requires 
interpretation of such entities, events and processes and requires reiterant anticipation 
of what a specific data model will effect, and how it will enable and restrict the 
outcome of data mining operations.  
This relates to boyd & Crawford’s distinction of social networks between humans of 
flesh and blood on the one hand and behavioural networks or social graphs observed 
by the software machines of service providers on the other. Mistaking machine-
readable behaviours for action seems part of the business-case for predictive 
analytics. Though this may be a very productive ‘mistake’ it might in fact trigger a 
situation where behaviours draw the curtain on action; who cares whether you had 
reasons or intentions, if your behaviours correlate with your genetic disposition, 
match with your online social graphs or with the combined data collected by 
government agencies in the course of your life? boyd & Crawford thus set the stage 
for two ethical issues.  
1. Does the fact that personal data are publicly available render their exploitation and 
monetization ethical, or does it?  
2. Should we accept the novel inequalities created by the knowledge asymmetries 
between data subjects and data controllers, or should we?  
We can add four epistemological issues that incorporate a number of less obvious but 
far more pervasive ethical issues: 
3. Traditional natural and social sciences start from theoretical reflection that is 
tested by deriving a hypothesis that can be checked against a sample (this is called 
falsification and is supposed to create robust knowledge). What does it mean to 
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 GITELMAN, Lisa, ed. ‘Raw data’ is an oxymoron. Cambridge, MA – London, England: MIT Press, 
2013.  
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skip the theory and to limit oneself to generating and testing hypotheses against 
‘a’ population? 
4. Data science provides for a number of alternative techniques to detect patterns in 
data sets, which will often have alternative outcomes. If public and private service 
providers mostly employ only a subset of such techniques, what does this mean 
for the robustness of such outcomes and for the extent to which they should 
inform the architecture of autonomic computing systems? 
5. In the old days we said ‘if men define a situation as real, it is real in its 
consequences’ (Thomas Theorem),20 now we must admit ‘if machines define a 
situation as real, it is real in its consequences’. What does this mean for the 
salience and the bias of the decision systems that depend on Big Data Analytics? 
6. If the intestines of these decision systems are opaque to those affected by their 
operations, and even to those who operate them, where does this leave democracy 
and the Rule of Law? Are due process and fair administration, informed consumer 
choice and the right not to be subject to invisible decision-making on the verge of 
becoming illusive concepts? 
 
II Personal Data Management in the era of Big Data 
 
VOLUNTEERED, OBSERVED AND INFERRED DATA 
Let us return to the AB experiment. The data are mined to improve the user 
experience, or the website’s performance, or the profitability of the business model, 
but they are not volunteered by the visitor. No forms are filled, no questions asked. 
The data here are observed data, and they usually consist of behavioural data. In its 
project on Rethinking Personal Data, the World Economic Forum (2013) recently 
launched a report under the title of Unlocking the Value of Personal Data: From 
Collection to Usage. One of the key aspects of their supposedly new approach 
includes ‘new ways to engage the individual, help them understand and provide them 
the tools to make real choices based on clear value exchange’. This is very interesting. 
For a long time, the value of personal data has been seen as related to an individual’s 
personality. German legal doctrine, for instance, understands the fundamental rights 
to privacy and data protection as personality rights, meaning that they are related to 
the dignity and autonomy of a person and should be seen as constitutive for the self;21 
not as something to trade with. In the realm of consumer-business relations as well as 
iGovernment, the legal framework of EU data protection is focused on data 
                                                 
20
 Cf. MERTON, Robert K. The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy. The Antioch Review (8) 2, 1948, p. 193–210.  
21
 ROUVROY, A., Yves POULLET. The right to informational self-determination and the value of 
self-development. Reassessing the importance of privacy for democracy. In: S GUTWIRTH, P. DE 
HERT, Y. POULLET, eds.  Reinventing Data Protection. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009. HORNUNG, G., 
Ch. SCHNABEL. Data protection in Germany I: The Population census decision and the right to 
informational self-determination. Computer Law & Security Reports, 2009 1, p. 84–88. 
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minimisation. As consumers or as citizens people should only provide the data that 
are necessary for a specific purpose and their usage is only lawful as long as this 
purpose (or a compatible purpose) holds. This also holds when the data are provided 
with consent.22 Once, however, we begin to think in terms of ‘a clear value exchange’, 
and speak of personal data as ‘a new asset class’, the monetary value of personal data 
is indeed unlocked. In a previous report the WEF (2011) actually highlights this point, 
by stressing the hidden potential of personal data as ‘untapped opportunities for 
socioeconomic growth’, urging a renewed discussion of the collection and usage of 
such data that takes into account the current monetisation of personal data. This 
renewed discussion starts from an alternative typology of data, clearly distinguishing 
between volunteered, observed and inferred data, rather than between personal and 
non-personal data. Traditional data protection legislation still seems focused on 
volunteered data, even in the case of third party access to personal data or in the case 
of legal obligations to provide data. Volunteered data are defined as ‘created and 
explicitly shared by individuals, e.g. social network profiles’. I would add that all the 
forms you fill, credit card data you consciously provide are volunteered data. Note 
that the distinction between volunteered and observed data is not about whether a 
person has provided consent or even about whether they should be considered 
personal data. The processing of both types of data may involve or even require 
consent and they may both be qualified as either personal or non-personal data, e.g. 
depending on the use of anonymisation techniques. The business case for AB 
research, traffic management, NSA spying programs, law enforcement or fraud 
detection is seldom restricted to the processing of volunteered data. It is more often 
based on observed data, usually behavioural data, measured by the software 
machineries that mine, share, and sell such observed data to attain the holy grail of 
Big Data, which is inferred data. So, we have volunteered, observed and inferred data 
and I dare say that these different types of personal or ‘unpersonal’ data require 
differential legal protection.23 It is one thing to consent to the sharing of credit card 
data in order to buy something online, or to the sharing of a photograph posted on 
Facebook and an altogether other thing to consent to machine to machine sharing of 
your online behaviours, or to the sharing of your public transport behaviours or your 
biometric behaviours. Moreover, the inferred data, e.g. profiles derived from data 
mining anonymized aggregated data, may have the biggest impact on a person. If 
three or four data points of a specific person match inferred data (a profile), which 
need not be personal data and thus fall outside the scope of data protection legislation 
– she may not get the job she wants, her insurance premium may go up, law 
enforcement may decide to start checking her email or she may not gain access to the 
education of her choosing.  
                                                 
22
 DE HERT, Paul, Serge GUTWIRTH. Privacy, Data Protection and Law Enforcement. Opacity of the 
Individual and Transparency of Power. In: Erik CLAES, Antony DUFF, Serge GUTWIRTH, eds.  
Privacy and the Criminal Law. Antwerpen Oxford: Intersentia, 2006.  
23
 Unpersonal data is neither personal nor not-personal in the sense that the distinction is not relevant. 
Anonymised and inferred data may be not-personal data as far as art. 2(x) Directive 95/46 EC is 
concerned, but when applied to an individual person its impact may be more substantial than the use of 
volunteered data.  
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Under the EU data protection framework, however, there is a right not to be subjected 
to such profiling to the extent that it is fully automated. 24  There are three major 
exceptions to that right: consent, contract and a legal obligation. If such an exception 
applies there is a transparency right: we must be told that profiling has determined the 
decision and we must get information on how different factors were weighted. To 
become an effective right, those who employ the data analytics that significantly 
impact a person should provide transparency of the backend system (what is the 
software actually doing) in a clear and comprehensible manner. And, since end-users 
should not be entirely dependent on those who ‘own’ the data servers and machine 
learning technologies, they will require their own transparency tools, i.e. on the 
frontend of the system. Such transparency tools can be created as platforms, run by 
consumers or trusted third parties, that allow to share and mine consumer data to 
predict how the data will probably be monetised or how they might be used by law 
enforcement. Such platforms would employ inference engines to counter-profile the 
profilers, or, in other words: to guess how we are being anticipated, to read how we 
are probably read, to pre-empt how our intentions might be pre-empted.25  
 
USER-CENTRIC PERSONAL DATA MANAGEMENT 
This brings us to the solutions currently proposed. After the failure of large-scale 
employment of privacy enhancing tools (PETs), followed by the notion of Privacy by 
Design (PbD) which has been taken up as a legal obligation in the proposed General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) under the heading of Data Protection by Design 
(DPbD), the new kid on the block is called personal data management (PDM).26 This 
can best be understood as an attempt to build architectures and trust frameworks that 
should enable data minimisation and informed consent, hoping to bring end-users 
back into the equation of personal data ecosystems. I will not go into the technicalities 
but refer to the definition of Bus & Nguyen (2013) of context-aware PDM as an ICT 
application that:  
enables an individual to control the access and use of her personal data in a way that 
gives her sufficient autonomy to determine, maintain, and develop her identity as an 
individual, which includes presenting aspects (attributes) of her identity dependent on 
the context of the transactions (communication, data sharing, etc.), and enabling 
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consideration of constraints relevant to personal preferences, cultural, social, and 
legal norms.27 
Lots of vague terms here, but sometimes being more specific means reducing 
protection. Defining notions such as ‘identity’, ‘sufficient’, ‘context’, and 
‘consideration’ will be necessary, but every further definition will also reduce the 
applicability of the concept – so we better leave such further definition to the 
operational level.28 It is important to note that the term identity is used here in two 
different ways. First as a reference to the self and second in the technical sense of the 
complete set of attributes that defines a person or in the technical sense of one or 
more data points that uniquely identify a person. The idea behind PDM is that the use 
of technical identities has an impact on the development of identity in the sense of 
selfhood, meaning that the use of identities in the technical self should be constraint to 
protect identity construction in the sense of selfhood. 29  One way of achieving 
protection against ‘unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s identity’,30 
would be to employ PDM as an instrument for minimal disclosure, for instance by 
enabling authentication by means of attribute-based credentials instead of full 
identification. By only revealing the attribute that is necessary for the provision of a 
service (being under or over a certain age, male or female, having or not having a 
certain diploma, having enough credit) unnecessary dissemination of personal data is 
prevented. One of the drawbacks of this way of proceeding is that people can then be 
profiled on the basis of their attributes; though they may be anonymous they may still 
be targeted, since Big Data allows inferences from the usage of such attributes. 
Another drawback may be that service providers will need proof that the claimed 
attribute is indeed a ‘true’ attribute of that person, requiring a link with a root identity 
that is a real or true identity; especially in situations where no such link is currently 
required this could increase constraints on identity construction, based on 
personalised profiling. 
 
MONETISING ONE’S PERSONAL DATA 
Some forms of PDM actually strive to enable the monetisation of personal data by the 
data subject herself. This is interesting because it simply acknowledges that personal 
and other data are currently monetised (xxx), and accepts that this has consequences 
for those to whom the data relate or to whom data derivatives are applied (xxx). 
Instead of struggling against monetisation it embraces the idea that this might create 
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added value, but also demands that those whose data are used as a resource, get a 
share of the profits (Novotny and Spiekerman). We could apply Rawls’ maximin 
principle here:31 whoever manages to create added value is entitled to a bigger share of 
the cake, as long as the least advantaged do not see their share diminished. This is a 
way to achieve distributive justice. It is based on the idea that if we all share the same 
cake, distribution should in principle be equal, whereas anybody who enlarges the 
cake may claim a slightly bigger share, in order to incentivize such enlargement. The 
side constraint with the maximin principle is that this may never disadvantage those 
with the smallest shares, basically requiring they should be better off also (or at least 
retain their original share). So, PDM should not create asymmetries that make us – 
citizens, consumers – worse off in terms of our share of the monetary value than 
before the advent of Big Data Analytics. This would entail engaging us in the 
monetisation and allowing us to gain part of the profit. It also sustains the incentive to 
invent applications for Big Data Analytics because whoever creates added value gets 
a good share of the profits.  
Obviously there are other types of reasons to engage citizens and consumers in the 
creation of added value; it should enhance our autonomy, allow us to figure out how 
we can influence autonomic decision systems, compensate for the knowledge 
asymmetries that would otherwise subsist. In short it should reinstate the system of 
checks and balances that is constitutive for the Rule of Law, thus in a way reinventing 
the Rule of Law in the era of Big Data. Not merely in relation to the government, but 
also in relation to other big players that may be more powerful than a government. 
There are, however, also major concerns with PDM systems that allow data subjects 
to monetise their personal data. The main question is to what extent PDM may simply 
be co-opted by the industry and government agencies to further monetise our data, 
precisely by involving our initiative.32 For instance, what happens if we can foresee 
what behaviours will increase the monetary value of our behavioural, observed data? 
What comes from the awareness that we can make money by matching those inferred 
profiles that turn us into profitable entities? When shall we start reading specific 
content just because it enables monetisation, instead of reading content that is of no 
interest to the data brokers, advertising networks and viral marketeers of the Big Data 
era? Are we going to be influenced by the automated micro-payments that will 
accompany our machine-readable behaviours? Will this turn us – the observed 
clusters of data points – into slaves of Big Data? Or will it? 
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III  Purpose Binding in the era of Big Data 
Before answering the question of Big Data slavery, I will investigate one of the core 
principles of data protection legislation, that is under extreme pressure to give way to 
a more lenient approach to data usage. This concerns the principle of purpose binding, 
which entails two interconnected rules: (1) the processing of personal data is only 
allowed for explicit and specific purposes and (2) further processing is not allowed if 
the purpose no longer applies, unless another purpose which is not incompatible with 
the original purpose applies.33 Purposed binding is deeply entwined with the notion of 
minimal disclosure or data minimisation; once the purpose no longer holds processing 
becomes unlawful even if there was consent. Under current legislation in the EU a 
person cannot waive her right to compliance with purpose limitation, because 
whatever ground applies (art. 7 DPD) all the conditions of lawful processing apply 
(art. 6 DPD). In the case of consent (one of the grounds of art. 7) purpose limitation 
applies (art. 7.a). My questions in this contribution are how this principle relates to the 
‘n = all’ of Big Data, and how it relates to the PDM-type of solutions. More 
specifically, how does purpose binding relate to contextual integrity, Helen 
Nissenbaum’s salient proposal to rethink privacy and data protection in an era where 
the opposition between the private and the public sphere is way too coarse to do the 
work.34 
 
PURPOSE BINDING AND ‘N = ALL’ 
To the extent that Big Data enables to ‘do at a large scale what cannot be done at a 
smaller scale’ purpose binding seems at odds with the business case for Big Data. Big 
Data wants n, nothing less. Data minimization, e.g. enabled by attribute based 
credentials (ABC) technologies, means that you reduce the data points that are 
provided (volunteered or observed data) to those necessary for the purpose of 
processing. For instance, instead of giving your ID to prove your age when buying 
alcohol, you just claim that you are above 18 and provide the necessary proof without 
revealing other data points (e.g. your precise age, male or female, etc.). Data 
minimization also means that instead of allowing third parties to track your 
clickstream behaviours across different websites, you e.g. only allow the websites you 
visit to observe behaviours necessary for the technical and functional operations of 
the website. The purpose of the processing of observed data is then limited to what is 
necessary for a smooth user experience within the domain of your attention. However, 
what if observed data are mined to serve the legitimate interest of the advertising 
network that is tracing and tracking you? What if the explicit and specific purpose of 
Google Adwords is to create added value for both the advertiser and the website that 
offers space to auction ads based on behavioural advertising? What if governmental 
departments decide to reuse data on the basis of a new legal obligation, thus sparing 
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citizens the boring task of providing the same data time and again? Can data collected 
for billing of energy usage be used for fraud detection, if the fraud concerns social 
security? Can a legal obligation for smart grid operators to provide data for purposes 
of law enforcement overrule the principle of purpose binding? The ‘n = all’ of fraud 
detection implies a business case for having ever more data points on citizens, 
correlating e.g. energy usage, mobility, location, telecom traffic data to fraudulent 
behaviours. What is the logic of art. 6(4) of the proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation that stipulates that: 
Where the purpose of further processing is not compatible with the one for which the 
personal data have been collected, the processing must have a legal basis at least in 
one of the grounds referred to in points (a) to (e) of paragraph 1. This shall in 
particular apply to any change of terms and general conditions of a contract.  
Does it means that, contrary to current law, one can consent to reuse data for an 
incompatible purpose? Or, can governments create new ‘legal obligations’ to reuse 
personal data, or claim that reuse is necessary and proportional ‘to perform a task 
carried out in the public interest’? Is this a good way to render data protection 
compatible with the possibilities to create added value in the Big Data era? Or is it? 
The Art. 29 WP thinks this erodes both data minimization and purpose binding, 
because consent means so little in times of cognitive overload, and new legal 
obligations should not automatically justify reuse.35 On the other hand, if Big Data is 
of interest because it generates patterns we could not have foreseen and thus enables 
usage that could not be predicted, then purpose binding is presumptuous and starts 
from the wrong premise. We do not know in advance what use is made possible, and 
to find out we must first mine the data, and to figure out which data are relevant we 
must mine as much data as possible (‘n = all’). The value of Big Data can only be set 
free if we admit the novelty of the inferred knowledge and rethink purpose binding in 
line with the innovative potential of its outcomes.36  
 
IF PDM IS THE SOLUTION, WHAT WAS THE PROBLEM? 
Let’s investigate this by checking whether PDM can be combined with purpose 
binding. PDM means that a person has adequate access to and control over where 
when and how her own data are being processed. And, perhaps, also for what 
purpose, though that is not obvious. If PDM merely allows to grant access and to have 
information on what entity is using the data, this does not help with enabling purpose 
limitation. To achieve such a thing would require to check the privacy policy, the 
terms of service or the user license agreement in advance and to trust that the data 
controller will stick to it. Alternatively, it would require to ensure that the data travel 
around with a backpack of metadata that determine their legitimate usage, including 
the terms of their deletion (e.g. self-executing whenever certain conditions apply). 
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Preferably this backpack should enable some form of machine-to-machine reporting 
on what is going on, while PDM could for instance have a control panel or dashboard 
that enables targeted destruction of individual data streams if usage is found to be 
unlawful or – in the case of processing on the basis of consent – if usage is no longer 
desirable (withdrawal of consent).  
However, if we look at the incentive structure of Big Data Analytics, we are again 
confronted with the notion of ‘n = all’. PDM may be used to facilitate the mining of 
as much personal data as possible. Notably, if PDM is designed in a way that gives 
you a share in the monetization of your data points, your PDM dashboard may 
become a play station that generates real income. You can learn to switch data 
streams to generate the largest profits, you can manage your data in a way that 
provides you with free access to most of the services. Or can you? Maybe you can 
manipulate the data streams – of your observed, behavioural data – such that they 
match profitable profiles. You can learn to game the system. And – of course – some 
will try to hack your data streams to gain illegal access to your profits. But, switching 
data streams, changing behavioural data patterns probably implies changing your 
behaviours. Do we really want to tune our machine-readable behaviours to engines of 
commercial exploitation – and is it really us who will be doing the exploitation once 
PDM systems are in place? Or will those who offer us money be nudging us into 
compliant behaviours? Compliant with whatever those willing to pay for our data 
have in mind for us: will anything we do be measured, stored and mined to make us 
more nudgeable, more compliant and more foreseeable? 
What problem – then – does PDM solve? Does it allow us the illusion of being in 
charge of our own data points, thus inviting us to collaborate in our own subversion? 
Are we in the last stages of us becoming a composite of commodified and 
commodifiable data points; a cognitive resource for the intelligent computing systems 
that manage our external environments, critical infrastructures, income redistribution 
systems (called taxation), and of the upcoming infrastructure of distributed 3D 
printing? Is the knowledge asymmetry between the end users on the one hand, and the 
companies, the engineers and the designers of distributed interconnected personal data 
processing systems on the other hand, not already so extensive that the sheer idea of 
regaining control betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the extent to which we 
are already under control (their control)? For now, I propose that we do not get 
carried away by techno-pessimism, though I will return to this point in the last part of 
this contribution. 
 
PURPOSE BINDING AND CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY 
Before that, I will briefly investigate the link between purpose binding and contextual 
integrity. Both concern the idea that legitimate expectations about the sharing of data 
partly depend on the role of the data controller (is it your doctor, the NSA or 
Facebook?), the purpose of processing (is it improving your health, preventing 
terrorist attacks or increasing shareholder value?) and the context (are we talking 
about medical advice, safety and security or commerce?). The difference is that 
purpose binding requires prior articulation of specific, explicit, and legitimate 
purposes that bind and thus restrict the further processing of personal data. Contextual 
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integrity seems more vague on the one hand, not necessarily requiring prior 
determination of explicit and specific goals; and more precise on the other hand, 
making legitimate processing dependent on the legitimate expectations that go with a 
specific context, independent of explicit articulations of specific purposes. Another 
difference is that the purpose limitation principle is applicable to individual personal 
data, whereas contextual integrity applies to data flows. The first is a legal obligation 
that applies to data processing within EU jurisdictions, the second is an ethical 
principle, developed within the US by 37 and incorporated in the Consumer Privacy 
Bill of Rights declared by the Obama administration (without binding force, however, 
and obviously not meant to be applicable to the NSA). 38  Contextual integrity is 
especially relevant in the US, because of the so-called third party doctrine that holds 
that once data have been provided to another party they are considered public and can 
be shared by that other party with e.g. law enforcement, unless stipulated otherwise in 
the relevant contract, privacy policy or statute. Purpose binding may rely too much on 
the old idea that it is possible and sensible to decide on the purpose of data processing 
beforehand, whereas the added value of Big Data partly resides in the potential to 
uncover new purposes that may create a win-win situation. Contextual integrity, 
however, could restrict database fusion, prohibiting the usage of data in a context that 
is not consistent with the context in which it was collected. Just like in the case of 
purpose binding this raises the issue of the added value of unexpected findings in 
cross-contextual data mining; findings that may generate new medical cures, better 
prediction of terrorist intention, or more diverse consumer choice?  
Purpose binding as well as contextual integrity challenges the business case for Big 
Data; can we have our cake and eat it too? To figure this out, we need to analyse the 
dangers of re-use of the same data for a different purpose, e.g. after consent or based 
on a legal competence, as well as the dangers of cross-contextual data mining. These 
dangers can be summed up as those of a surveillance society, where the surveillance 
may be done by the government but also by commercial enterprise and the biggest 
threats come from where the two sit down to exchange their data. Both the NSA 
tapping into the metadata of large Internet companies, and science & commerce 
nourishing on Open Data, increase the ‘n = all’ conundrum and allow for the use of 
refined data derivatives to achieve frightful illusions of omniscience. In the next 
section I will return to what is actually the problem with this ‘n = all’ type of 
illusionary omniscience. Here I would claim that: no, we cannot always have our 
cakes and eat them too. Sometime we can, sometime we cannot. It all depends. But if 
we cannot, we must invent ways to prevent ourselves from being lured into sharing 
our data points in exchange for instant satisfaction or immediate rewards. Though 
behavioural economics is somewhat shallow in its analysis of interaction, it confirms 
the old myth of Odysseus and the Cyrens. Since we seem to have a preference for 
immediate satisfaction over and above later rewards, we need to build protection into 
our environments, helping to keep us on course. Requiring prior determination of the 
purpose of processing may be one way to prevent overly enthusiastic data harvesting. 
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And, as a legal stipulation it may have more force than an ethical principle to stick to 
context.  
Now, let us return to the question of who we might become as individuals and as a 
society, with increasing dependence on Big Data infrastructures. This should help us 
to assess whether prior purpose specification and use limitation are necessary 
conditions for developing the kind of personhood and the kind of community we 
want. 
 
IV Endings: who are we in the era of Big Data? 
AUTO-COMPLETE: NUDGING PEOPLE INTO COMPLIANCE? 
This reintroduces the question of the impact of Big Data Analytics on our mind, self 
and society. Morozov has nicely summarized the drawbacks of the imagined 
omniscience (‘n = all’), combined with the solutionist mindset of Silicon Valley’s 
geeks. In his latest book he reminds us that: 
[i]mperfection, ambiguity, opacity, disorder, and the opportunity to err, to sin, to do 
the wrong thing: all of these are constitutive of human freedom, and any concentrated 
attempt to root them out will root out that freedom as well.39 
Legal philosopher Roger Brownsword actually argued similarly with regard to 
techno-legal solutionism:40 if technologies enable us to enforce compliance, we are no 
longer in the realm of law. To qualify as law, we need to right to disobey the law, to 
challenge its validity in view of higher legal norms and to contest its application in 
particular instances. The checks and balances of the Rule of Law and the division of 
tasks between legislator, administration and the courts, imply that law appeals to 
reason and is not set in stone. Whenever technologies enforce compliance, we are in 
the realm of administration or discipline. If Big Data allows a persistent subliminal 
pre-emption of our intent, if it autocompletes our environments on the basis of 
inferred preferences and enables the kind of calculated nudging that will turn us all 
into law abiding, friendly, healthy and productive fellows, we should shrink back and 
reconsider.   
So, we should not be fooled by techno-optimists that may have their own reasons to 
nudge us into auto-completion. But, neither should we be overly impressed by techno-
pessimists that announce the end of times. Though it is correct to observe that at the 
moment we are fair game for smart environments that entice us to turn our selves 
inside-out while becoming addicted to the latest app, it is also correct to observe that 
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we learn. Just like machines that run the code of the latest form of artificial 
intelligence, we learn. The question is what we stand to learn here. As indicated 
above, the bottom line is that we must invent ways to anticipate how smart 
environments anticipate us, to guess how we are being read, to figure out what 
current futures are inferred and how they will influence our future currency. Because, 
whereas machines can develop many present futures (predictions of our future 
behaviours) there will be only one future present. To come to terms with smart, data-
driven environments we must learn how to outsmart them, to stay one step ahead of 
them while they try to stay one step ahead of us. This may sound exhausting, but it 
need not be. On the contrary, it is where we come from and what we cherish in human 
society: the reiteration of a mutual double anticipation. 
 
A DOUBLE CONTINGENCY OF HUMAN MACHINE INTERACTION?  
Sociologists have called this the ‘double contingency’ of human interaction.41 It is 
what constitutes both human society and individual selves. It is what makes for 
uncertainty about whether we mean the same thing when referring to the same word, 
pressing us for techniques and technologies that stabilize meaning despite its inherent 
instability. Double contingency means that I need to anticipate how you will 
understand me, to be able to make sense. Mead called this ‘taking the role of the 
other’, imagining how another sees us, and thus being born as a person, thus 
developing a sense of self.42 When I tell a young child: ‘you are Sally’ while pointing 
to her, and ‘I am Mireille’ while pointing to myself, the child will repeat: ‘you Sally’ 
while pointing to herself, and ‘I Mireille’ while pointing to me. I will correct her, but 
she will be surprised, repeating both the gesture and the name. The moment that Sally 
understands that to me she is ‘you’, while to herself she is ‘I’, she is born again, 
capable of taking the perspective of another to herself. She is now capable of 
reinventing herself, predicting herself, reflecting on her self, provoking expectations 
of her self and, ultimately, being provocative by violating those expectations. This is 
where both our sense of humour and our sense of human freedom emerge. Such 
freedom cannot be reduced to consumer choice or to freedom from external 
constraints, it is tied up with the ability to re-view oneself and change course, based 
on how we foresee that our actions will be interpreted. And all this is made possible 
by taking the perspective of another. This is why Ricoeur spoke of Oneself as 
another. 43  This is also why Zizek remarked that ‘communication is a successful 
misunderstanding’;44 not just any misunderstanding, but one that succeeds. In what? In 
nourishing the productive ambiguity of human language, allowing us to act in concert 
despite recurrent shifts in meaning. In generating new meaning from the interstices of 
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un-intended mis-understandings, thus opening the floodgates for new ways of seeing 
the same things, which thus become other things, allowing us to play around with the 
implications of our actions, re-viewing them with new eyes – those of other others.  
What happens (1) if it is now machines that anticipate us, and what happens (2) if we 
begin to anticipate how these profiling machines anticipate us? It seems that to ‘come 
into one’s own’ in a smart environment we have to take the perspective of the 
inference machines. While the machines are trying to figure us out, we will try to 
game the system and decide for ourselves whether we are indeed the type of person 
they have calculated. If PDM enables us to guess the value of our personal data, the 
double contingency may be reinstated. We might then develop the technologically 
mediated capacity to guess how we are predicted and learn how to pre-empt the pre-
emption of our intentions. That sounds good. There are, however, three caveats here: 
The first relates to the question of what happens if machines anticipate us. We should 
admit that they can only take into account machine-readable data and their inferences 
are contingent on a population consisting of machine-readable data. N, therefor, 
cannot be All, because not everything can be discretized. Datafication is both a 
multiplication of reality, a virtualization in the sense of Deleuze,45 and a reduction of 
reality, because it necessarily translates the flux of life into discrete data points. This 
is the same for written language, by the way. But written language is visible for those 
who learned to read and write, whereas computer language is the secret knowledge of 
the experts. 
The second relates to the question of what happens to us if we begin to anticipate 
these machines. Shall we, in figuring out how machines ‘think’, become more like 
machines and lose some of the ambiguity inherent in the usage of spoken and written 
language? Is Brian Christian right that instead of machines becoming more like 
humans, we are becoming more like machines?46 Is Maryanne Wolf right that the 
morphology and the behaviour of our brains will change and that we must ask the 
question what must be preserved, highlighting that we cannot take for granted that our 
brains will adapt without losing what was developed in the course of our evolution as 
reading animals?47  
The third relates to the transparency that reinstates the double contingency. The PDM 
model, described earlier, may enable intuitive transparency by means of monetisation. 
The introduction of a tertium comparationis in the form of money, of a price, could 
empower us to foresee how our data points match inferred behavioural models. But, 
as we have seen above, this may create perverse incentives. The question is, however, 
whether we have alternatives.  
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Currently, the transparency that is provided whenever prior informed consent is 
required creates a ‘buffer overflow’: the amount of information it involves floods our 
bounded rationality and this enables manipulation by what escapes our attention. 
Though some would applaud the Enlightenment of Descartes’ idées claires et 
distinctes, others may point out that they generate overexposure, wrongly suggesting 
the possibility of light without shadows. The metaphor of the buffer overflow actually 
suggests that we may require selective enlightenment, and that we are in dire need of 
shadows. The more interesting question, therefor, will be what should be in the 
limelight and where we need darkness. In Renaissance painting the techniques of the 
claire-obscure, the chiaroscuro, the Helldunkel were invented and applied to suggest 
depth, and to illuminate what was meant to stand out. By playing with light and 
shadow the painting could draw the attention of the onlooker, creating the peculiar 
experience of being drawn into the painting – as if one is standing in the dark, 
attracted by the light. Big Data analytics invites us to reinvent something like a claire-
obscure, a measure of transparency that enables us to foresee what we are ‘in for’. 
This should enable us to contest how we are being clustered, correlated, framed and 
read, thus providing the prerequisites for due process. This should, finally, enable us 
to play around with our digital shadows, acquiring the level of fluency that we have 
learned to achieve in language and writing.48 
I end this contribution with a reference to the enigma of the Sphinx on the cover of a 
book I recently co-edited with Katja de Vries.49 It depicts Oedipus in the clearing of a 
clair-obscure. He stands out strong, wilful and looks somewhat impatient. The Sphinx 
stands in the shadow of a cave, potentially irritated that a trespasser has finally solved 
her riddle. However, though Oedipus may have solved the riddle, he cannot evade the 
fundamental fragility it foretells. Though monetisation of personal data points may 
help to reinvent a new version of the double contingency that constitutes our world, it 
cannot resolve the fundamental uncertainty that it sustains. In fact we need 
transparency tools that help to reinstate this uncertainty, rather than the over-
determination that monetisation might otherwise enable.50 
 
                                                 
48
 This paragraph draws on HILDEBRANDT, Mireille. Profile Transparency by Design: Re-enabling 
Double Contingency. In: M. HILDEBRANDT, E. DE VRIES, eds. Privacy, Due Process and the 
Computational Turn: The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of Technology. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013, p. 238-9. 
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